Ali Hamid

Iraqi Kurdistan referendum

A comparison of the Iraqi Kurdistan referendum and the Catalan’s referendum within the Iranian media coverage.

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The week from 25th September and 1th October 2017 two referendums took place in two different regions in the world. One of which occurred right next to Iran in the Middle East and the other one in Europe. The Iranian media covered these two events in significantly different ways from each other reflecting political context. This essay is going to primarily identify the stories and then it will make an overview from their actual beginning as political events. Furthermore, it will address specific stages to show which specific media source they were taken from. At the next step it will focus on the main characters and the ways they have been described with considering their level and place on the Iranian news agenda. Then, this comparative essay will look at how the Iranian media attempted to shape its people`s attitudes and behaviour towards the stories by showing the difference between episodic and thematic frames in order to affect the public opinion. Finally, it will display whether there have been any opinion pieces and traffic produced on social media.

The step which this study has decided to approach to the stories are the referendum dates and when they were shown on Iranian TV news. Kurdish referendum fell out on 25th of September 2017 in northern Iraq and the Catalan’s referendum took a place on the 1th of October in Spain. Both Kurdish and Catalan referendums turned into a running story that were updating almost hourly in the Iranian press since they have come to the light. Often, both the Catalan’s referendum and the Kurdish referendum were amongst the most important news stories of the day in most of Iranian media.

Since the Iranian media environment is closely controlled, the government has a full control over media outlets across the country (UNHCR,2017). However, on paper, Iranian government offers freedom of expression to the journalists (HRW,2017), but like other totalitarians regimes, their law details a long list of exceptions’ for journalists and limiting them under threat of punishment (CPJ, 2017). From here, throughout Iranian media coverage of two referendums evidence suggests that there had been some instructions from above to the media outlets, forcing them to use specific words, phrases and captions for describing the Kurdish referendum. Words such as “separatist”, “gamble” were usually used in order to describe “the wrong” decision made by Kurdish leaders (Delroshan,2017). However, it seems they were less compelled in their coverage of the Catalan’s referendum. The double standard of coverage by the Iranian media could suggest the Kurdish referendum was seen as a threat to the Iranian sovereignty, since Iran is a home for more than 8 million of Kurds.

Accordingly, for the both cases, there were only voice of few specific-selected and dependents analysts that have been heard. The main characters of two cases were spoken about and represented as silent actors. Moreover, most of the Iranian media outlets emphasised at the foreign intervention as the main reason of the Kurdistan vote. For example, Tasnim News Agency mentioned; “the foot-steps of American’s neo-conservatism policy on Barezani’s decision is undeniable.” (Zarei,2017). On the other hand, the attempt for the self-determination was bolded in the Catalan’s case. For instance, Fars News opined that “Catalonians are so tired of inequality in the “so-called” free world.” (Fars News,2017). The examples given above could highlight how the Iranian media was one-sided in its coverage of both stories in order to promote a specific point of view.

In addition, the description of the main actors in the stories, most of media outlets described the Catalan referendum as an “independence” referendum (Mehr News,2017), whereas the Kurdistan referendum was described as a “separatist” vote and “conspiracy of enemies” (Soleymani,2017). Moreover, many Iranian newspapers, described Masoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurds, as a fixer working for “Zionists”. For instance, Keyhan wrote that Israel is behind the referendum to destabilize the Middle East (Bolori,2017). Whereas, the same newspaper called Catalan’s prime minster as “leader of the independence” (Shariatmadari, 2017).

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Iranian media coverage towards the Kurdish referendum was negatively and critically and as usual there was a poor possibility for Kurds to have their say in any Iranian press, whereas on the Catalan’s case, the story was displayed positively in most Iranian outlets. Although the Kurds independence side was completely deprived of Iranian media attention, the opposition side was always present. Iranian media coverage, in Kurdish referendum was more analytic and less informative, which is one of the characteristics of “thematic” framing (Iyengar, 1991), whereas the Catalan’s referendum was more informative than analytic with the aim of “episodic” framing (Iyengar, 1991). For example, in the Kurds case, many Iranian political analyses appeared on the news and talk shows and giving their opinion on the dangers or risks of separation of Kurdistan (Ofogh TV,2017).

According to professor Shanto Iyengar article “The Framing of American Politics”, there are two ways of framing for news stories. He calls them “episodic and thematic” framings, and each one of them have different effects on their audience. He has also given a simple and understandable definition for the two types of frames. “an episodic frame would focus on an individual, a thematic frame would focus on the issue.” (Iyengar, 2005). According to the Professor Iyengar, “episodic frames are more effective than thematic frames in directing the effect of emotional reactions into support for the specific policy.” (Iyengar, 2005). Referring to his definition, in Iranian media, episodic framing was by far the main mode of frames in the Catalan’s case, which generated stronger commiseration, than the thematic frames about the Kurdish case. In effect, episodic framing reinforces the Islamic regime message of inequality and public discontent in the west. On the contrary, thematic framing, as witnessed by this essay, reduced people’s emotional attachment toward Kurds. For instance, Nameh News Agency chose a Catalonian named Marco who has lost his grandfather in Franco’s time. The news agency claimed that Marco was once fined for hoisting Catalan’s flag, when he was in Madrid last year (Sabzian,2017). This was an episodic framing of Catalans referendum to generate stronger compassion with an individual. On the other hand, Mehr News Agency’s thematic framing for the Kurdish referendum by talking about conflict of interest between Kurdish referendum and the neighbouring countries (Nazemi, 2017).

On social media it was the Kurdish referendum that pushed the Iranian users to tweet and comment whereas this happened on the Catalan’s case rarely. It also might be because of closeness to Kurdistan, both culturally and geographically. Namely, dr. Zibakalam showed his sympathy with Kurds and criticized Iranian way of treating the issue. “Kosovo, Bosnia and Pakistan and all the examples that we support, have the right to determine their own destiny, but Kurdistan case is vulnerable to the sovereignty, is not this hypocrisy?” (Zibakalam,2017). However, he was arrested and charged with acting against national security and spreading propaganda against the state.

In summary, The Iranian media’s coverage of the Catalan referendum was contrasted with their coverage of the Kurdistan referendum vote, which the Islamic Republic of Iran publicly opposed, and its media widely criticized. The Iranian media coverage of the two stories could be seen in line with Iranian Government Propaganda through the print and broadcast media. The coverage of both events was highly justifiable could be described in the context of government propaganda. On the one hand, the Iranian government considers the referendum in Kurdistan, strategically threat and from its view it was necessary to strongly oppose and take a stand against it, whereas, on the other hand, by supporting a referendum on the enemy's ground, Iranian’s propaganda machine wanted to induce its audience with the idea that they should be happy and grateful with stability in their country, while even European countries are suffering from instability.

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